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SPECTERS OF KURDISH NATIONALISM:  
GOVERNMENTALITY AND TRANSLATION IN TURKEY 
 
 
 
Abstract: This essay examines translations of the Kurdish epic poem Mem û Zîn into Turkish, tracing 
the logics behind these state-sponsored translations and examining how acts of translation are also 
efforts to regulate, translate, and erase Kurdish subjectivities. I argue that the state instrumentalizes 
Mem û Zîn’s potent nationalist currency in order to disarm present and future claims of Kurdish 
national autonomy. Using translation as a counterinsurgent governmental tool, the state attempts to 
domesticate Kurdish nationalist discourses even as it reproduces them, thereby transforming Kurdish 
nationalism into a specter of itself. Attending to this specter, however, allows us to see how these texts 
resist domestication: conjured by the state’s technologies of counterinsurgency, the specter circulates 
as an inassimilable insurgent, an affect of resistance, the kernel of alternative social imaginings. 
 
Keywords: counterinsurgency  translation  nationalism  governmentality  neoliberal 
multiculturalism  spectrality 
 
 
O Lord! You know that poor Xanî 
Is captive like the pen 
His heart is truly in your hands 
His hand is certainly out of his hands 
 
Yareb! Tu di zanî Xanî’ye jar 
Teşbîhê bi xameya girîftar 
Qelbê wî di dest tedaye elheq 
Destê wî di dest xwe nine mitleq 
 
–Ehmedê Xanî, Mem û Zîn 
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he classic tale of Mem û Zîn, written by Kurdish poet Ehmedê Xanî in 
approximately 1692, tells the story of two star-crossed lovers named Mem and Zîn 
from different cities in the same region of Kurdistan. Mem and Zîn fall in love at the 
celebration of Newroz, the Kurdish New Year, but Beko, the villain, prevents their 
romance by imprisoning Mem for over a year. In prison, Mem is on the verge of death 
when Zîn finally is able to see him. Mem dies soon after, and Mem’s friend Tajdîn 
beheads the villain Beko. Soon thereafter, Zîn dies of sorrow while weeping over Mem’s 
grave. Zîn is then buried in the same grave with Mem, and Beko is buried at their feet; 
although “love flowered from the earth” (“şîn bû ji zîraeta evînê”) of their grave, the 
body of Beko sprouts a thorn bush that grows amid the flowers.  
Writing in the northern dialect of Kurdish known as Kurmancî, Xanî’s poetic rendition of 
this recurrent oral tale is framed by hundreds of verses about the richness and beauty of 
the Kurdish language. In one early chapter, titled “Our troubles” (“Derdê me”), Xanî 
exhibits what seems to be a very striking awareness of the powerful linkages between 
language and the formation of political community: 
Da xelq-i nebêjitin ku Ekrad  So that people won’t say that the Kurds 
bê me ‘rifet in, bê esl û binyad.  have no knowledge and have no history. 
Enwa ‘ê milel xwedan kitêb in  Nor that all sorts of people have their books 
Kurmanc-i tenê di bê hesêb in.  and only the Kurds are lacking. 
(1996, 170-2) 
 
Xanî goes on to comment on the rich literary traditions in both the Ottoman and the 
Safavid Persian Empires, asserting that the Kurdish language also offers the possibility of 
a vibrant and colorful literature, and he connects this to the political conditions of the 
time: 
Ger dê hebuya me îttîfaqek  If we had unity among us 
vêk ra bikira me inqiyadek  if we listened to each other 
Rum û ‘Ereb û ‘Ecem temamî  all of the Romans and Arabs and Persians 
hem’yan ki me ra dikir xulamî.  they would all be our servants.1 
(1996, 168) 
 
Xani’s writings, and particularly this chapter, have been a useful source for Kurdish 
intellectuals and nationalists because they lend “a prophetic aura and historical 
legitimacy” to the Kurdish national project (Strohmeier 2003, 29). This chapter, for 
T 
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instance, was published in the first issue of the literary journal Kürdistān in Cairo in 1898 
(Strohmeier 2003). Also in the 1890s, another Kurdish poet named Hacî Qadrî Koyî, a 
vociferous nationalist, reads Xanî’s book as “the book of our nation” [kitêba milletê me] 
and places himself within the genealogy of Kurdish nationalism as the inheritor of Xanî’s 
literary and nationalist legacy (van Bruinessen 2003, 50). Kurdish writers since then, 
such as Celadet Alî Bedirxan and Mehmed Uzun, have relied upon Xanî’s text in order to 
historicize claims to Kurdish nationhood and to legitimize Kurdish autochthony in the 
region (Strohmeier 2003; Uzun 2006a, 2006b, 2007; see also van Bruinessen 2003). 
Uzun, perhaps the most celebrated Kurdish-language writer of the 20th century, praises 
Xanî for “[placing] national consciousness and feelings into the lives of Kurdish people 
with poetic expression” (2006b, 27). Similarly, based upon Xanî’s book, Kurdish scholar 
Amir Hassanpour makes the claim that Kurdish nationalism was one of the earliest 
instances of nationalism’s emergence in the world (1992). Over the course of the 20th 
century, then, Mem û Zîn contributed to the formation and development of contemporary 
Kurdish nationalism, and in turn, this nationalist reading of Mem û Zîn has become the 
most dominant approach to the text. 
In this article, I examine a number of transfigurations of Mem û Zîn: (1) the first 
translation into Turkish published in 1968, (2) a translation published in 2010 by the 
Turkish Ministry of Tourism and Culture, and (3) a television adaptation that ran from 
2012-2013 on the state-owned and operated Kurdish language channel TRT Kurdî 
(formerly known as TRT 6). The first of these generated significant controversy and led 
to a five-year long series of trials for the translator. Conversely, the latter two were 
heralded in the media and by the state as positive developments in overcoming the 
ongoing ethnic tensions and strife between Turks and Kurds, a conflict that is the 
perpetual thorn in the side of the Turkish national project—so much so that it is 
impossible to imagine Turkish nationalism without the threat posed by Kurdish 
nationalism and the Kurdish question at large.  
The impulse to regulate language has been a central element of nation-building and the 
consolidation of an ideal citizen-subject since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 
1923, and the Kurdish language was marginalized, forbidden, and criminalized in this 
process. As a consequence, the Turkish state’s so-called “Kurdish opening” (“Kürt 
açılımı”), which began in 2008, and its concomitant negotiations with(in) Kurdish, should 
be approached critically. Much of the contemporary discussion of Turkey’s Kurdish 
language policy by human rights organizations and civil actors has been framed through 
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narratives of democratization and pluralistic humanism, wherein the state’s patronage of 
Kurdish cultural production and the translation of Kurdish artifacts into Turkish are the 
means by which Kurds supposedly gain rights, cultural capital, citizenship, and equality 
under the law. This teleological narrative of inevitable progress from violent and anti-
democratic tribalism towards a humanist, capitalist society overlooks important dynamics 
of state power, discipline, and control. In fact, as I will argue, the legal sanctioning and 
subsequent emergence of these new, so-called autonomous avenues toward Kurdish 
‘freedom’ are an expansion of existing governmental technologies; they are insidious 
mechanisms of domination that render themselves invisible by providing the illusions of 
choice and mobility through the possibility of limited recalcitrance. As Mitchell Dean 
writes, “contemporary liberal rule rediscovers freedom as a technical modality, and is 
able to translate (even if only roughly) the concerns of social and cultural movements 
into its own vocabulary” (Dean 1999, 155, emphasis mine). This article, accordingly, is 
concerned with such acts of discursive translation into the “vocabulary” of the state. 
I would first like to begin by providing a brief account of some of the pivotal factors of 
Kurdish language politics in Turkey in order to contextualize the status of Kurdish 
language cultural production today. Then, I will examine the 2010 translation of Mem û 
Zîn commissioned by the Ministry of Tourism and Culture as it relies upon and departs 
from the 1968 translation of the text into Turkish. Given the state’s sensitivity regarding 
the Kurdish language, its decision to commission the translation of a book like Mem û Zîn 
suggests that more complex dynamics are at play than mere notions of pluralism and 
geographic kinship. Why should the state feel compelled to draw attention to a cultural 
artifact that historicizes claims to Kurdish autonomy? Subsequently I will analyze the 
television show, In the Shadow of Mem û Zîn (“Siya Mem û Zîn”), and the ways that it 
departs from and restages the romance of the two main characters in order to disarm and 
transfigure the nationalist treble of the story into one that corroborates the Turkish 
national project. I argue that the show is a unique manifestation of a highly complex and 
still-evolving governmentality, one that privileges consumerist multiculturalism as a 
vehicle for remaking Kurdish viewers into obedient, disciplined, neoliberal subjects of 
the Turkish state. How does the show, as a translation—an “afterlife” (Benjamin 1968, 
71)—attempt to unravel the nationalist promise of Mem û Zîn and reimagine the affective 
geography of Kurds in Turkey?  
I will conclude with a theoretical meditation on how these translations are a symptom of 
the neoliberal transformation of state and society, and how they spectralize discourses of 
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Kurdish nationalism. I define the specter here as an indistinct yet persistent trace that 
manifests out of a subsumed subaltern history; it is an affective relic of that which is 
always disappearing but has never fully departed. The specter is a useful concept for 
understanding these translations within the framework of Turkish state governmentality 
precisely because it shows us that language and national identity are constantly under 
construction, and it attends to the inevitable recurrence of a Kurdish nationalist 
subjectivity as that which is “neither living nor dead, present nor absent” (Derrida 1994, 
63). The spectral recurrence of Kurdish nationalism shows that even neoliberal efforts to 
assimilate the Kurds—through the simulation of cosmopolitan tolerance and the illusion 
of (limited) cultural autonomy—has not succeeded in laying to rest the Kurdish question. 
The specter, then, is both symptomatic and constitutive of neoliberal multiculturalism, 
even as it compels us to contemplate other possible presents and futures. 
Linguistic Nationalism in the Turkish Republic2 
As mentioned, the Kurdish issue and the Kurdish language have always troubled the 
discursive promise of a homogenous Turkish nation, compromising the integrity of 
Turkish geographies and the totalizing promise of the Turkish language. Because 
speaking the Kurdish language was the most easily discernible difference between Kurds 
and Turks, the roots of Republican Turkey’s policies of ethnic homogenization extend as 
far back as the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The claim that Kurds have no separate, 
unique language or history can be found, for example, in the aggressive nationalist 
discourse of the Young Turks (Jön Türkler) who came to dominate the Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP; in Turkish, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) in the first decade of 
the 20th century. The CUP conducted sociological research that, according to 
Zeydanlıoğlu, was used “in order to justify the Turkification of Anatolia in general and 
the Kurds in particular” (2012, 101).  
After the foundation of the Republic, the Turkish language reform of the 1920s and 
1930s was intended to consolidate, purify, and streamline the Turkish language in what 
Nergis Ertürk describes as “extreme self-surgery,” given the excess and the deep 
radicalism of the changes that were made (2011, 87). For Ertürk, the language reform in 
Turkey was responsible for fomenting a deep internal fear of the linguistic other, who 
was codified as and associated with death in early Republican nationalist literature: as she 
argues, “modern nationalism, in the Turkish context as elsewhere, is prone to destructive 
violence precisely in its suspicion of its own origin in a translative vernacular” (88). The 
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necessary creation of the other, based upon linguistic difference, was therefore crucial to 
early Republican era politics and has played a large role in the ongoing violence against 
minorities in Turkey. Official recognition of the Kurdish question as a problem 
challenges the state’s century-long vision of linguistic and territorial homogenization 
(Yeğen 2011, 123). Consequently, it is useful to examine that century-long vision and its 
turning points in order to critically approach the state’s interest in the contemporary 
translation of Kurdish texts into Turkish. 
In the late 1920s, just a few years after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, a group of 
law students in Istanbul initiated a movement known as the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” 
campaign, which received significant support from the state because it aligned so closely 
with official language policies and helped disseminate such ideologies at the individual 
level (Zeydanlıoğlu 2012, 103; Dickinson 2014, 121). The state also sanctioned and built 
education and cultural centers called “People’s Houses” (“Halk Evleri”), in order to 
disseminate Turkishness across Anatolia, particularly in the Kurdish region (Dickinson 
2014, 121). The “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign and the introduction of the People’s 
Houses contributed to the radicalization of policies regarding the Kurds and the Kurdish 
language, including the introduction of the “Settlement Law” (“İskân Kanunu”, Law 
2733) and the “Reform Plan for the East” (“Şark Islahat Planı”), which banned the public 
use of Kurdish and established standards for the resettlement of “those connected to 
Turkish culture” and “those not connected to Turkish culture.” As part and parcel of these 
laws, Kurds incurred fines for speaking Kurdish in public and were forcibly relocated to 
other areas like Istanbul so they would speak Turkish only and conform to Turkish 
cultural practices (Law 2733; Aslan 2007; Fernandes 2012; Dickinson 2014). In 1937 and 
1938, the state executed an operation in the province of Dersim (later renamed Tunceli), 
massacring tens of thousands of Kurdish Alevis; this operation was accompanied by the 
construction of boarding schools in the area as part of what General Staff Marshal Fevzi 
Çakmak called the “internal colonization” of the region (Üngör 2012, 130). One such 
school—run during these years by a woman named Sıdıka Avar, supposedly chosen for 
the job as a “missionary” by Atatürk himself—was populated by girls who had been 
kidnapped from Kurdish villages in the region (Avar 2011; Üngör 2012). Girls at the 
school had their heads shaved and were abused by the school’s staff. Though Turkish 
language instruction was the priority, their curriculum also included courses on 
citizenship, national security, math, cooking, housekeeping, childcare, sewing, 
embroidery, and health care (Üngör 2012). In other words, the goal was to psychically, 
culturally, and socially domesticate these Kurdish girls into upright Turkish citizens. 
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The state continued to maintain antagonistic policies towards its linguistic minorities over 
the next several decades. In 1959, a law was passed to rename villages, natural 
landmarks, and other places with non-Turkish names. Over 12,000 villages, “amounting 
to every third village in Turkey,” had been given new Turkish names by the year 2000 
(Zeydanlıoğlu 2012, 107-9). Following the 1960 coup d’état, the military government 
developed a secret report filled with proposals to “solve the problem of Kurdish 
separatism and regional underdevelopment,” which reiterated previous techniques of 
assimilation, such as forced resettlement and sociological/anthropological research, and 
extended them into the cultural domain through an effort to translate Kurdish music into 
Turkish and broadcast the music in translation (Zeydanlıoğlu 2012, 108). The 1970s saw 
the radicalization of the Kurdish left in the wake of the increasing official circumscription 
of the Kurdish language and Kurdish culture, culminating with the formation of the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or PKK), a socialist group whose 
goal is to liberate the Kurds from the Turkish state. After the 1980 military coup, anti-
Kurdish policies crystallized with the creation of a new constitution that sanctified 
Turkish ethnicity and the Turkish language as the fundaments of Turkish citizenship; 
other laws regarding language passed during this time assert that “the mother tongue of 
Turkish citizens is Turkish,” thereby performing the imagined integrity of the Turkish 
nation (Law 2932).3 In 1984, civil war broke out between the PKK and the state. From 
1987 until 2002, a state of emergency was maintained in the Kurdish southeastern region 
of the country, a situation that allowed for martial rule, resulting in violent practices such 
as enforced disappearance, torture, and extrajudicial killings. During this time, speaking 
Kurdish remained a highly contentious act; Kurdish journalist İrfan Aktan has written 
about how the gendarme raided villages and arrest those who owned cassettes of Kurdish 
musicians like Şivan Perwer (Aktan 2013).  
In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, several developments helped ease the rigidity of 
state discourse regarding the Kurdish question. Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK, was 
captured in Kenya and returned to Turkey, where he was tried and remains imprisoned. 
Additionally, the rise of an Islamist political movement, most notably in the form of the 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP), as well as 
Turkey’s renewed efforts to enter the European Union, eventually led the state to 
acknowledge that the Kurdish question was a thorn in Turkey’s side. By 2008, the ruling 
AKP government had initiated the aforementioned “Kurdish opening,” with the aim of 
facilitating peace with the PKK and overcoming ethnic tensions between Turks and 
Kurds.  
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The Kurdish opening is a multi-scalar project that relies upon different branches of the 
government and civil society to help bring Kurds into the fold of the national community. 
The Religious Affairs Directorate, for example, elaborated a discourse of “religious 
brotherhood” (“dinî kardeşlik”) in order to privilege religion-based kinships over national 
ones (Görmez 2012). Similarly, as I described above, the Turkish Ministry of Tourism 
and Culture has initiated several projects aimed at promoting cultural recognition, which 
include the translation of Mem û Zîn and the creation of the state-run Kurdish language 
television channel TRT Kurdî, which broadcasts news and other programming in several 
dialects of Kurdish. In 2013, the government released a “Democratization Package” 
(“Demokrasi Paketi”) that promised elective courses in the Kurdish language4; an end to 
the 85-year-long ban on the letters Q, W, and X, which are absent from the Turkish 
alphabet but present in the Kurdish alphabet; and the allowance of political campaigns in 
Kurdish and other non-Turkish languages (Law 6529). In spite of these nominal 
developments, however, Welat Zeydanlıoğlu argues that “there have been no 
fundamental changes of Turkey’s Kurdish policy…. Turkey’s linguicidal policy 
continues” (2012, 120). This is in large part because the Turkish state continues to 
persecute Kurdish scholars, politicians, activists, and organizations. Similarly, anti-
Kurdish sentiment remains a prominent force in social and public discourse, implicitly 
condoned by state officials (Zeydanlıoğlu 2012; Aktan 2014).5 
An important and frequently overlooked dynamic of this Kurdish opening is the import of 
global capitalism and neoliberal forms of governance into Turkey. The AKP government 
has overseen Turkey’s astral rise in the global economy; in 2008, during the global 
financial crisis, the Turkish market remained relatively stable. Neoliberal 
governmentality in Turkey has transfigured affective and physical geographies and the 
ways that people move through those spaces and interact with one another. The roots of 
this neoliberalism reach back to the 1980s: Cenk Saraçoğlu claims that former Prime 
Minister Turgut Özal and his administration launched the Southeast Anatolia Project 
(GAP)—an ongoing initiative aimed at developing the terrain of the Kurdish southeast 
into a productive zone for the benefit of the Turkish national economy—because they 
saw “the economic backwardness of Eastern Anatolia and the profound inequality 
between eastern and western regions of Turkey” as at the core of the widespread dissent 
in the region and as a pathologic symptom of the PKK’s rise and popularity (Saraçoğlu 
2011, 89-90).6 Here the work of culturally administering Kurds is explicitly linked with 
the same work of making them productive and engaging them as economic actors. While 
the translations and transformations of Mem û Zîn that I analyze below may not be 
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explicit elements of GAP’s neoliberalizing work, it should nonetheless be clear that they 
fit into the larger rhetoric of fixing, modernizing, and urbanizing Kurdish life-worlds 
according to the state’s normative governing vision. Neoliberalism is therefore both a 
symptom and a consequence of the Kurdish opening; it is a form of interpellation aimed 
at producing new Kurdish subjects. 
Domesticating Translation and the Power of Language 
Given this history of Turkish linguistic nationalism through state policies relating to the 
Kurds, as well as the centrality of Mem û Zîn to contemporary claims to Kurdish 
nationhood, I now turn to the politics of translating a text like Mem û Zîn. In the 
introduction to her book The Translation Zone, critical translation theorist Emily Apter 
writes: “as an act of disruption, translation becomes a means of repositioning the subject 
in the world and in history; a means of rendering self-knowledge foreign to itself; a way 
of denaturalizing citizens, taking them out of the comfort zone of national space, daily 
ritual, and pre-given domestic arrangements…. Translation is a significant medium of 
subject re-formation and political change” (Apter 2005, 6). Apter further argues that the 
way we understand and conceive translation after the September 11 attacks has 
fundamentally changed, that translation has become a tool for warfare and in particular 
for counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency as a technique of war compels the 
counterinsurgent to understand the insurgent better than the insurgent understands itself. 
Translation, as a technique of transforming and domesticating knowledge, thus becomes 
a way of enacting domination over the cultural and linguistic other.7 
The state-commissioned translation of Mem û Zîn published in 2010 was written based on 
an original handwritten manuscript located in the Istanbul Archaeology Museum; a 
facsimile of this manuscript is published in the translation, on the left pages, opposite the 
Latinate Kurdish transposition and the Turkish translation on the right. The presence of 
the antique, handwritten manuscript of Mem û Zîn in the state archive, as well as the 
state’s capacity to translate it, to know and apprehend it in its entirety, attests to a 
particular governmental logic that resonates with Ann Stoler’s relational conception of 
the archive and governmentality. Because the archive is a site for the accumulation of 
cultural texts and artifacts—of knowledge itself—it is not enough to look at archival 
documents as representative of a particular moment in history. Instead, we have to read 
the presence of such documents “along the archival grain,” making sense of them 
according to the governmental logics that expropriated them into the archive in the first 
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place (Stoler 2002, 100). I therefore read the state’s translation of Mem û Zîn as a kind of 
archival counterinsurgency, an effort to actively dispossess Mem û Zîn of its historicity 
and to domesticate it into a repertoire of Turkish multiculturalism. 
The translated text features a preface by former Minister of Tourism and Culture, 
Ertuğrul Günay, condemning the “repressive mindset” (“yasakçı zihniyet”) of the past, 
constellating Mem û Zîn within world literature, and claiming that this translation is 
useful “in terms of reflecting and documenting Turkey’s deep-rooted, pluralist, historical, 
written, and intellectual reservoir” (“Türkiye’nin köklü, çoğulcu, tarihsel, yazınsal, ve 
düşünsel birikimini yansıtmak ve belgelemek bakımından”) (Xanî 2010, i-ii). This 
humanistic claim stands in stark contrast to the violent discourse on Kurds that defines 
much of the Republican era, while extending and affirming the historicity and territorial 
integrity of the Turkish nation-state. It also exemplifies the use of historiography-as-
counterinsurgency, the dynamic of governmentality that I described above. Furthermore, 
that the Minister of Tourism and Culture regards the text as a testament to the strength of 
pluralist democracy in Turkey even as the text’s translator reinforces a discourse that 
denies the legitimacy of the Kurdish language gestures toward an incongruous and 
ambivalent dynamic of neoliberal governance that I will attempt to unfold: that of the 
ever-present and ever-absent specter. 
The Ministry of Tourism and Culture selected Namık Açıkgöz, a professor at Muğla 
University, to translate Mem û Zîn. Notably, Açıkgöz does not speak Kurdish, and his 
academic articles have primarily been written on Ottoman divan poetry between the 15th 
and 18th centuries (Açıkgöz 2014). In one such article from 2007, Açıkgöz asserts that 
there is very little Kurdish in the text: “The Kurdish version of Mem u Zin bears a 
linguistic particularity that frequently arouses the impression of being Farsi. Ahmed-i 
Hânî says that the work is written in the Kurmancî dialect [of Kurdish]. However, in the 
work, outside of 25-30 verbs and a similar number of prepositions and other elements, the 
majority of the words are filled with elements of Farsi and Arabic” (2007, 39). Açıkgöz 
reiterated these claims in a 2010 interview for the online newspaper Haber Vaktim. In the 
interview, Açıkgöz asserts “Within the framework of my findings, Kurdish is a dialect of 
Farsi,” reinstantiating a long genealogy within state discourse on the Kurdish language 
that regards Kurdish as either non-existent or a perverse dialect somewhere between Farsi 
and Turkish (2010a). In a book-length rebuttal to Açıkgöz’s translation, Kurdish scholar 
Kadri Yıldırım challenges this assertion with a quantitative analysis of the text: out of 
26,560 words, claims Yıldırım, 19,601 (74%) of them are Kurdish, 6,015 (23%) are 
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Arabic, 918 (3% are Farsi), and 26 (less than 1%) are Turkish (2011, 9). While we should 
of course be wary of the notion that words are fixed essentially, timelessly, and 
exclusively to a particular language, the disparity between the figures is a telling 
indication that the degree to which Mem û Zîn can be called Kurdish is a politicized and 
contentious topic.  
A scholar of Kurdish language and literature in the “Living Languages and Literatures” 
Department at Mardin Artuklu University, Yıldırım’s 200-page rebuttal, titled A Critical 
Approach to the Culture Ministry’s Translation of Mem û Zîn, illustrates not only that 
Açıkgöz committed a number of rather glaring errors in his translation, but also that he 
took a significant amount of his translation from the 1968 translation done by Mehmed 
Emîn Bozarslan. Yıldırım laments the selection of Namık Açıkgöz as translator, given 
that a number of clearly stronger candidates (such as Zeynel Abidin Zinar and Selim 
Temo) were recommended to the Ministry. According to the press release announcing 
Namık Açıkgöz’s selection as translator, the Ministry chose him “with great care” 
(“büyük hassasiyetle”) (Yıldırim 2011, 8). As Yıldırım notes in the book, it is difficult to 
emphasize just how significant it is for the state to be sponsoring and publishing a 
masterpiece of classical Kurdish literature; his disappointment, which “increased the 
more that I read of the book,” compelled him to write the rebuttal (203). Furthermore, 
Yıldırım limits his analysis to the first 30 chapters, claiming that there were so many 
mistakes and cases of plagiarism in the Açıkgöz translation that, “in order to keep our 
book from being too long, we did not provide any examples from the last 30 chapters of 
the book” (113). 
In addition to extensively plagiarizing Bozarslan’s translation, Açıkgöz also fills in the 
lines that had been censored in Bozarslan’s translation. Açıkgöz has never translated a 
Kurdish text before, and his expertise in the realm of classical Ottoman literature relates 
only tangentially to the classical Kurdish of Ehmedê Xanî. In addition to securing a 
native Kurdish-speaking undergraduate student who would “provide me with his views 
about the Kurdish language,” Açıkgöz also tells readers in his translator’s introduction 
that “I drew on the M. E. Bozarslan translation [M. E. Bozarslan yayımından istifade 
edilmiştir] for couplets that were difficult to comprehend” (Xanî iv). A comparative 
analysis of Açıkgöz’s translation and Bozarslan’s translation shows just to what degree 
Açıkgöz had difficulty comprehending the Kurdish couplets: in one chapter consisting of 
90 lines, 41 of those lines are identical to Bozarslan’s translation, slightly altered 
Bozarslan’s word order, or have one word replaced with a close synonym. This chapter is 
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not an anomaly, either: Kadri Yıldırım notes over 400 lines in the first 30 chapters that 
are identical in the Bozarslan and Açıkgöz translations (Yıldırım 2011). Furthermore, 24 
lines had been left out of Bozarslan’s translation—forcibly cut out of the text by censors 
because they contained the most controversial passages concerning Kurdish political and 
cultural community—that are now present in Açıkgöz’s. In other words, what the state 
had forcibly suppressed from Bozarslan’s translation (a genealogy of/for Kurdish 
nationalism) are recuperated in the Açıkgöz translation, itself commissioned by the state. 
The broad plagiarization of Bozarslan’s translation is particularly significant because 
Bozarslan faced extensive trials for attempting to publish his translation of Mem û Zîn 
(van Bruinessen 2013). Consequently, we can see that Açıkgöz’s reappropriation of 
Bozarslan’s intellectual labor and political commitment to the Kurdish movement is more 
than mere plagiarism. It is an attempt to extend the state’s domain over narratives of 
Kurdish cultural resistance in order to disarm the intellectual genealogies of Kurdish 
literature and deploy them within a new tradition of Turkish multiculturalism. We can 
also see this by looking at the way Açıkgöz characterizes the value of his translation. 
In interviews given during the press junket aimed at promoting the translation, Açıkgöz 
spoke about the peace process in Turkey and provided his perspective on how Mem û Zîn 
should and should not be read. According to Açıkgöz, the only proper reading of Mem û 
Zîn is one that privileges the elements of Sufi mysticism and cherishes the love and the 
tragedy of the two lovers (2010b). Not only, he claims, is a nationalist reading of the text 
entirely misleading, but such a reading is insidious and threatening: “So what if a text like 
this is Turkish, so what if it’s Kurdish? If you look at this text in an ideological way 
because of its language, then of course the other side is also going to become ideological” 
(2010b). Language, for Açıkgöz, is therefore a sterile set of traffic signs that direct a 
reader toward the intention of the author, which in his reading is a message of Sufic love. 
He continues, “Mem u Zin [sic] has become a buzz word [iki lafından biri] for separatist 
organizations… As if anti-religious Marxist-Leninist ideologies have anything in 
common with the content of Mem u Zin” (2010b). Ehmedê Xanî, as we have seen, is 
quite explicit about why he decided to write Mem û Zîn in Kurdish (he even titles a 
chapter of the poem “Reasons for writing the book in this language”), and he also links 
the use of the language to the political conditions of his time, calling for resistance 
against the Ottomans, the Arabs, the Persians, and the Tajiks by using both “the pen” and 
“the sword.” Furthermore, Xanî writes that he wants to use the story of Mem û Zîn as a 
“pretext” (“behane”) to “expound upon the trouble in [his] heart” (1996, 186).  
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My point here is neither to justify a nationalist reading of the text nor to disqualify a 
reading that focuses on its Sufic tropes. Rather, I am interested in the ways that Açıkgöz 
and the state at large attempt to supplant a nationalist reading with a Sufic (Islamist) one 
in order to domesticate the text and disarm it as a political object in the public sphere. In 
another article, Açıkgöz asserts that “of course literary texts are written in a language 
used by a person; however, in these kinds of works, language cannot go beyond being a 
mere unit of communication. In other words, literary texts actually do not have a 
language; they are the shared holdings [ortak malı] of humanity” (2010c). It is telling that 
Açıkgöz frames Mem û Zîn and literature writ large in terms consistent with commodity 
fetishism. For the AKP, as I described above, neoliberal democracy converges at the 
intersection of capitalism and multiculturalism with the intent of inducting a new citizen-
subject whose practices of identification are inconsequential so long as s/he abides by and 
abets the material and cultural accumulation of resources.  
Açıkgöz extends this metaphor of language as “holding”, comparing the book Mem û Zîn 
to raw material and natural resources: “It is especially important that Mem û Zîn was 
published by the state. As much as the minerals under this earth are ours; as much as 
everything atop this earth is ours; the loves and the sadnesses, the crying and the laughing 
of this earth are also ours. Our human spirit is in every love and every story nourished by 
this earth. Just like in Mem u Zin [sic]” (2010c). For Açıkgöz, as for the state, Mem û Zîn 
and the Kurdish language at large are akin to the minerals under the earth: raw materials 
that have been a natural fixture of the region for all time, but that nonetheless need to be 
refined, converted, transformed, and translated into usable goods for consumption. 
Indeed, as he says, it is especially important that Mem û Zîn was published by the state, 
whose institutional politics of representation mediate social relationships and ways of 
being accordingly. The publication is also a symbolic gesture that attempts to displace 
and disappear the histories of violence and denial that the Kurds have been subject to up 
until only very recently.  
Açıkgöz’s conception of language as interchangeable pieces in the machinery of 
literature is decidedly informed by capitalist notions of language, and is in keeping with 
more formal state discourse on the topic: former Prime Minister Erdoğan, in his inaugural 
address for the state-run Kurdish language television channel, asserts that “Language, for 
me, is an envelope. What matters is the message inside” (Erdoğan 2009). Understanding 
language as a system of vessels to bear productive messages extends capitalism into 
language, whereby words become as though the interchangeable parts of a machine 
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producing commodified goods and ideas. They are the weaponry with which the Turkish 
state is waging a cultural counterinsurgency. Rather than indicating an end to the civil 
war, these translations are part of a larger apparatus that perpetuates the conflict, masking 
it behind practices of “dense semantic maintenance” aimed at managing discourse and 
social psychology (Pratt 2009, 1524). Such translations erase histories of domination, 
while enacting those same forms of domination made possible by such histories.  
Multiculturalism and Affective Geographies in the Shadow of Mem û Zîn 
On January 1, 2009, the state-run Kurdish-language channel TRT 6 was inaugurated on 
Turkish television. The on-air opening ceremony began with the playing of the Turkish 
national anthem and the raising of the Turkish flag. At 7:00 PM that evening, former 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan delivered a special pre-recorded speech to the 
channel’s viewers. In the speech, delivered (primarily) in Turkish and dubbed in Kurdish, 
Erdoğan describes the channel as “the free voice of democracy [that] will glorify 
humanistic values, will nourish peace and calm, will not be separatist or exclusionary but 
unifying, and will contribute to the development and the deepening of democracy.” He 
ends the speech with a phrase in Kurdish that translates as “Best of luck to TRT 6” (“TRT 
6 bi xêr be”). 
Erdoğan’s speech to inaugurate TRT 6, now known as TRT Kurdî, traffics in the 
conventional language of the Republic, which is centered around notions of unity, 
oneness, and indissolubility. Yet the speech also offers a glimpse into the discourses of 
governmentality that structure the Kurdish opening: TRT Kurdî is intended to promote 
the values of proper citizenship and to interpellate Kurdish viewers into a multicultural 
Turkish nation, and in so doing, TRT Kurdî is intended to manage and contain dissent. 
Erdoğan’s linguistic switch at the end of his speech acts as a metonym for these new 
forms of governmentality, exemplifying the way in which the Kurdish language has 
become a tool for communicating and sustaining the Turkish nation. Much like the 2010 
translation of Mem û Zîn into Turkish, then, TRT Kurdî and its programs are a platform 
for counterinsurgency. 
I will now analyze an adaptation of Mem û Zîn that aired on the channel between 2012 
and 2013. The show, titled In the Shadow of Mem and Zîn (“Siya Mem û Zîn”), is a 
contemporary reimagining of Ehmedê Xanî’s tale, in which Mem is studying engineering 
in Istanbul and Zîn is educated and headstrong, with a passion for horseback riding. I will 
examine some key scenes in order to explore how In the Shadow of Mem and Zîn 
Glastonbury  Governmentality and Translation in Turkey 
Critical Multilingualism Studies | 3:1    
 
60
reimagines ethnic kinship and the geographies of Kurdish belonging. Then, I will 
examine the public reception and circulation of the show, a discursive repertoire that 
constitutes the show’s paratext, i.e. the framing narratives and representations that 
interpellate the text, ensuring its reception by the viewing public. Understanding the 
institutional politics of text and paratext “reveals cultural agency and operates as a 
renegotiation of the past in the public domain and a reidentification of individuals from 
the same geographic origin as kin” (Iğsız 2007, 169). The notion of geographic kinship 
posited by Mem û Zîn, imbricated with discourses of multiculturalism, conjures a neo-
Ottoman rhetoric in order to stage a heritage revival and an anachronistic history of 
supposed Ottoman concord and tolerance. According to the governmental logic of TRT 
Kurdî, built upon this neo-Ottoman multiculturalism, the Turkish state hopes to seize 
upon insurgent Kurdish subjectivities and remake them into upright citizens constellated 
within a multicultural Turkish nation (Young 2010, 147). TRT Kurdî transforms Kurdish 
cultural artifacts like Mem û Zîn into weapons, deploying them as a domesticating force 
against unruly Kurdish subjectivities. 
The first episode of In The Shadow of Mem and Zîn, premiering on 27 February 2012, 
opens with an image of Mem asleep in a minibus on his way back to his village in the 
mountains. He is dreaming of Newroz, the Kurdish New Year celebration, of people 
dancing govend around a bonfire, when in the distance a hazy and dark figure appears. 
We only see her eyes before she turns and flees through the snowy forest. Mem chases 
after her, and when she finally turns around, Mem reaches out to remove the veil hiding 
the rest of her face before he is awoken by another passenger: the minibus is approaching 
a gendarme checkpoint in the mountain. The gendarme, speaking in Turkish, stop the 
minibus, make all of the passengers disembark, and check all of their identification 
papers: there is a close-up of Mem’s distinctly recognizable Turkish government-issued 
ID. Upon the commander’s order, the passengers re-board the bus and continue on the 
road. 
The gendarme checkpoint is an all-too-familiar experience for people who have lived in 
and traveled through Turkish Kurdistan, and its continued institutionalization and 
routinization in the region exemplifies the ongoing symbolic and physical violence 
wrought by the Turkish state. Consequently, it is striking that the television show begins 
in this way: no longer are we located in Xanî’s semi-fictionalized, timeless, Cizira Botan 
in the heart of Kurdistan. Instead, our story is unfolding in the contemporary geography 
of the Republic of Turkey, thereby crystallizing the integrity of Turkish territory and the 
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Kurds’ place within it. Not only do the passengers in the minibus understand Turkish, but 
because the gendarmes’ Turkish commands are not subtitled, it is also presumed that the 
audience should and will know Turkish as well. By presuming the soft multilingualism of 
its Kurdish viewers, the program aids and abets technologies of linguistic 
homogenization that conform Kurdish to the common communicative framework of the 
multicultural Turkish nation (Noorani 2013). The program is therefore elaborating a 
Turkified Kurdish subjectivity, one that complies with the Turkish state and its forces, 
even as it is still trafficking in the literature of Kurdish nationalism and belonging.  
Over the course of the series, Mem and Zîn’s relationship faces similar challenges to the 
ones that arise in Xanî’s book. The strains on Mem and Zîn’s relationship are a micro-
scale staging of the geopolitical tensions that have shaped and continue to animate the 
Kurdish question in Turkey. While in Xanî’s rendition Mem and Zîn can never be 
together because they represent the two incommensurable parts of a Kurdistan divided 
between empires, In the Shadow of Mem and Zîn frames the stakes of their relationship in 
slightly different ways. To be sure, Mem and Zîn cannot have a happy ending: to give 
them that would corroborate the allegory between the consummation of their love and the 
territorial realization of Kurdistan as a political unit. However, the show does not 
conclude with the death of Mem and Zîn, as Xanî’s tale does. Instead, in the finale of the 
show, just after Zîn collapses and dies from grief, Zîn’s sister Sitî emerges with a baby 
she had with Mem’s friend Tajdîn. As everyone weeps, Sitî holds the newborn child next 
to Zîn’s body, and the screen fades to black. In the next and final scene, which takes 
place several years later, Sitî and Tajdîn are going with their daughter to the grave that 
holds Mem and Zîn. Sitî calls the child by her name—Zîn—and they sit beside the grave 
and weep as Sitî kisses the rings that once belonged to Mem and Zîn. Their ghosts appear 
behind the grave, clad in white, before the scene closes with a shot of the grave, and we 
watch a final montage of the pivotal moments of Mem and Zîn’s relationship over the 
course of the show (Siya Mem û Zîn ep. 56, 2013).  
The creative liberties taken with the conclusion of the plot should be understood as more 
than the mere contingencies of adapting for the genre of television drama. What is Sitî’s 
daughter—named Zîn, no less—supposed to represent? What does the show stand to gain 
from trafficking in ghosts? The performative gesture of naming Sitî’s daughter Zîn is a 
promise that Zîn-as-allegory—the Zîn that is half of Kurdistan—will endure as a 
nominal, disembodied, and dehistoricized entity: it is a guarantee that Zîn’s plight, her 
desire for consummation, is a mere shadow of the past. This fracture, between the Zîn of 
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the past and the Zîn of the present, is corroborated by the apparition of Mem and Zîn as 
ghosts, smiling at Sitî, Tajdîn, and little Zîn. In this regard, the name of the show, In The 
Shadow of Mem û Zîn, is particularly apt. It is no longer the story of an impossible 
Kurdistan—this Kurdistan has become a memory, a ghost—but one of an ever more 
probable Turkey. 
Upon its release, In the Shadow of Mem and Zîn was framed by pro-government 
newspapers like Yeni Şafak and Akşam as “reflecting Turkey’s mosaic” and “[having] 
united all of Turkey,” and politicians who attended the show’s release gala praised the 
show for its significance as a conciliatory gesture. A few months after the show’s 
premiere, the show released a photograph of the cast and crew as a group with the title 
“We are Turkey” and captioned with “Important Kurdish Sufi mystic Ahmed-i Hani’s 
[sic] great work Mem u Zin has united all of Turkey. From Turk to Kurd, Georgian to 
Circassian, Albanian to Laz, the entire crew of Siya Mem u Zin is working up a sweat to 
make the show a success” (İnal 2012). In the image, each individual cast/crew member is 
identified, along with his or her ethnicity and geographic origin. Thus, rather than 
rendering identificatory signifiers as insignificant, this image circumscribes them as 
descriptors that modify, qualify, and adhere closely to one’s Turkishness. Instead of 
challenging identity politics, the image then valorizes and refines practices of 
differentiation, taxonomization, and categorization. The filiation of acceptable kinds of 
citizenry—“from Turk to Kurd, Georgian to Circassian, Albanian to Laz”—is 
accompanied by the filiation and expansion of technologies for governmentality. 
In conjunction with the image, several of the main actors, the director, and the producer 
wrote short blurbs published in the Sabah newspaper about their ethnic identities. The 
producer, Aytekin Mert, states, “nobody [on the crew] is uncomfortable because of 
anyone else’s ethnic identity or religious affiliation. We meet on the common 
denominator of being human and being citizens of Turkey.” Similarly, the director of the 
show, Yusuf Güven, states that “what I learned from this photograph is that even if 
languages, religions, and ethnic roots are different, the language of brotherhood is also 
universal.” These claims, which along with the photograph, make up part of the show’s 
paratextual repertoire, carefully resignify non-Turkish identities through the rhetoric of 
multicultural intimacy and humanist belonging, whitewashing the histories of violence 
and inequality that marginalized and disenfranchised such identities in the first place.  
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These cosmopolitan discourses produce a cognitive dissonance amid the ongoing state 
violence in the Kurdistan region. Xanî’s version of the story of Mem and Zîn takes place 
in the Kurdish town of Cizre, and indeed, the tomb of the two lovers is a tourist 
destination. The town of Cizre is also a hotbed for political resistance and activity, with 
protests on behalf of the forcibly disappeared Kurds taking place every Saturday. In 
December of 2011, a few months before the premiere of In the Shadow of Mem and Zîn, 
the Turkish Air Force bombed a group of villagers in Roboskî, located in the mountains 
of Cizre, killing 35 of them (İnsan Hakları Derneği 2012). It is painfully ironic that the 
state deployed its adaptation of Mem û Zîn as a testament to pluralism in Turkey even as 
its ongoing use of systematic violence transforms the real-life setting of the story into a 
warzone. Ultimately, In the Shadow of Mem and Zîn is a useful prism for examining the 
techniques of governmentality unfolding within the Kurdish opening and the ongoing 
peace process. This coercive reconciliation uses the Kurdish language to resignify 
Kurdish cultural artifacts, exemplifying a phenomenon we might call the 
counterinsurgent potential of translation.  
Conclusion: Insurgent Specters 
In an article on linguistic warfare, Vicente L. Rafael argues that although 
counterinsurgent translation “detains” its recipients, it also “brings forth the 
untranslatable, calling us to respond to what cannot be converted and contained, to what, 
however minor and marginal, evades even as it is constantly menaced by imperial 
evocations” (2012, 77). The power of translation to detain us within a realm of meaning 
and to simultaneously bring forth the untranslatable suggests that the work of linguistic 
counterinsurgency is the precise dilemma that emerges from the Turkish government’s 
efforts to fix the meaning of Kurdish texts and identities.  
Historically, the field of Kurdish cultural production was beyond the state’s regulatory 
capacity because of the state’s obstinate refusal to acknowledge the existence of Kurds or 
the Kurdish language. Instead the field was subject to intense, violent forms of physical, 
psychic, and symbolic erasure. The recognition of Kurdish identity and the Kurdish 
language as potentially valid forms of social being—under the neoliberalization of the 
state’s relationship to society—nonetheless opened the way for the state to regulate, 
discipline, and domesticate those selfsame forms of being. By seizing upon the Kurdish 
language as a governmental vector, a weapon for counterinsurgency, the Turkish 
government has attempted to expropriate the very terrain of the fields of Kurdish cultural 
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production, socialization, and existence. Here, capitalism is joined with Turkish 
nationalism to materially and spiritually dispossess the Kurds, transforming Kurdistan 
into a geography of ghosts, a socioeconomic space that relies critically on Kurdish 
material and cultural production even as attempts to make its producers disappear (Roy 
2014). The state project of dispossession aims to regulate existing discursive structures in 
order to compel those who speak the Kurdish language to be the agents of their own 
abjection and dispossession.  
Meanwhile, the project of fixing a stable identity for the Kurdish other is never complete. 
Identity is always under construction, and consequently, it is perpetually a site for the 
contestation of the state’s interpellative project. As an ideal form constituted by 
difference, Turkish national identity is perpetually haunted by the Kurdish other that it 
has sought to domesticate and subsume (Vali 2002, 69). In the case of Mem û Zîn, the 
state has consigned its nationalist currency to historical erasure. Its state-sanctioned 
translation and adaptation constitute an archival counterinsurgency: a willful remaking of 
history into the narrative of domination. Yet, the text resists this domestication: the 
nationalist message makes its perpetual return as a specter that haunts its translations 
across language and genre. This message is an untranslatable, evasive, “seething 
presence” that detains the governmental project of the Turkish state (Gordon 1997, 8).  
The reappearance of the ghostly other is therefore an inevitable condition of the 
structures of feeling that exercise power in the state: indeed, as Jacques Derrida tells us in 
Specters of Marx, “haunting belongs to the structure of every hegemony” (1994, 46). The 
political potential of this haunting resides in its capacity to render visible the cracks in the 
hegemonies of neoliberalism and nationalism in Turkey. Conjured by the state’s 
technologies of counterinsurgency, the specter circulates as an inassimilable insurgent, an 
affect of resistance, the kernel of alternative social imaginings: it draws us beyond the 
political exigencies of the present to imagine the possibilities of other temporal and 
cultural worlds. Tracing the specter’s return allows us to recuperate the autonomy of the 
linguistic and cultural other, to give it new life.  
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1 Xanî does not use these identificatory signifiers in a contemporary fashion. Indeed, his 
descriptions do not correlate to the notions we have today of state, ethnicity, history, and 
power.  
2 The International Journal of the Sociology of Language published an issue in 2012 
titled “The Kurdish Linguistic Landscape: Vitality, Linguicide, and Resistance,” edited 
by Jaffer Sheyholislami, Amir Hassanpour, and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas. This issue was 
tremendously helpful for my research, and several of the articles (Fernandes; Öpengin; 
Üngör; Zeydanlıoğlu) go into much greater detail on the history and dynamics of the 
Kurdish language in Turkey. 
3 In 1981, the Turkish Parliament passed Law 2932, titled “Law Regarding Publications 
Made in Languages Other Than Turkish,” with the intent of forbidding the use of the 
Kurdish language. However, because official doctrine denied the very existence of the 
Kurdish language, the law could not expressly forbid Kurdish. Instead, the prohibition on 
Kurdish is achieved in a rather bizarre circumscription: “It is forbidden to express, 
disseminate, or publish thoughts in any language other than the first official languages of 
states recognized by the Turkish State.” The logical absurdity of this clause belies the 
ambivalence of the state’s approach to Kurds: the fierce and totalizing prohibition of 
something which, in the official imaginary, isn’t supposed to exist. 
4 The letters Q, W, and X were implicitly forbidden by the 1928 “Law Concerning the 
Acceptance and Implementation of Turkish Letters,” (“Türk Harflerinin Kabul ve Tatbiki 
Hakkında Kanun”). For more, see Ömer Şahin’s article in Radikal, “‘Q, W, X’in” 85 
yıllık yasağı bitiyor,” 27 September 2013. Link. 
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5 As recently as September 2014, a young Kurdish man in the region of Antalya was 
killed by a Turkish nationalist on the grounds that he was speaking Kurdish in public 
(Aktan 2014). 
6 GAP gained new political currency with the AKP’s Kurdish opening but also 
engendered significant controversy for several of its planned projects. According to the 
GAP website, “the project’s basic objectives include the improvement of living standards 
and income levels of people so as to eliminate regional development disparities and 
contributing to such national goals as social stability and economic growth by enhancing 
productivity and employment opportunities in the rural sector.” Similarly, the main 
objectives of the GAP Action Plan (which aims to accelerate the achievement of GAP’s 
goals) are “Implementing economic development, ensuring social development, 
improving infrastructure, and developing institutional capacity.” For more, see “GAP 
Nedir?”, Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, Link; see also “GAP EP Nedir?”, GAP Eylem 
Planı, Link. 
7 Most writing about translation as a tool for counterinsurgency has focused upon the 
actual experience of translating in zones of active conflict (Apter 2005; Pratt 2009; 
Rafael 2012). Here I am interested in techniques of counterinsurgency that extend beyond 
such zones of active conflict and into the lives of people who are not involved in such 
active conflict. Because counterinsurgency depends upon the pursuit of full knowledge of 
the insurgent, culturally and otherwise, in order to disarm her, we should also examine 
how the work of counterinsurgency is taking place outside of the battlefield. 
